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IN THE SIJPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 19107

-v-

STEVEN V.

SINGLETON,
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by information with Theft, a
third degree felony,

under ntah Code Ann.,

7fi-fi-404 (Supp.

l 97 R).

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty
of Theft, a third degree felony on November 16, 1982, in the
Third Judicial District Court

in and for Salt Lake County,

State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary presiding.

on

December 14, 1982, Appellant was ordered committed to the Utah
State Prison for the indeterminate term not to exceed five
years and fined

ssoo.no.

Defendant was granted a stay of

execution of the above sentence and placed on probation for a
period of three years under the supervision of the Department
of Adult Probation and Parole.

RELIEF S0llGHT 0N

/\Yl'F,Z\L

Respondent seeks an order of this rnurt affirminq
the verdict and judgment

in this casP.

STATEMENT 0F FA\TS
On November 11, 19Rl, around 7:nn r.m.,
Bailey was driving home (T.

2q).

into her driveway, she noticed a

Denise

As she slowed down to turn
little reflection and some

movement near a bush in the field next to her house (T.
40).

3n,

As she pulled into her driveway, a man stepped out from

behind the bush and walked right in front of her car (T.

30).

The man walked down the street and Ms. Bailey watched him
through her rear view mirror (T. 1n).

When she was sure he

was not around, she went to the bush and discovered a stereo
system (T. 41).

She immediately called the police (T. 41).

When Officer Maack arrived, he discovered that the
home next to Ms. Bailey's had been burglarized

(T. 90).

The

front door glass had been broken in order to gain entry into
the home ( T. 9 n ) •

Mr. Goldstein, the owner of the house,

observed that a stereo was missing (T. 90).

He had not given

permission to anyone to enter his residence or to remove the
stereo (T. 24).
Following this discovery, officer Maack called in a
description of the man seen by Ms. Railey to other officers in
the vicinity (T. 93).

The suspect was descrihed as wearing

blue jeans, a light weight blue jacket, a white shirt, a two

- 2-

tone baseball cap,

hiking type shoes, with dark hair, of

medium height and a slender build (T.

3q, 40).

Within fifteen

minutes, a suspect, exactly matching the description given by
Ms.

Bailey, was spotted just five and a half blocks away from

Ms. Bailey's home (T. g3).
The appellant, Steve Singleton was brought before
Ms.

Bailey for a show-up (T. 93).

Appellant was standing next

to the police car under a street light when Ms. Bailey
identified appellant

from her porch steps and then frori the

street, a distance of approximately ten feet (T. 78, 97).
Ms.

Bailey identified the appellant as the man she

had watched earlier in the evening walk from behind the bush,
in front at her car and down the street (T. 44).
Tt does not specify

in the transcript exactly when

appellant was placed under arrest, but following the
identification, appellant was informed of his Miranda rights
( T.

g 7).

When asked if he understood the rights and had

anything to say,

he said that he understood and didn't have

anything to say ( T.

gg).

Then on the way to the police

station he volunteered the following,

"I guess she saw me with

the stereo equipment

Neither Officer Maack

too?"

(T.

117).

nor the other officers had provoked the comment, nor had they
previously mentioned a missing stereo (T. 100), and when asked
how he knew about a stereo,
upset (T.

the appellant became restless and

118).

-3-

The appellant

had fresh cuts nn his han<is at the

time he was picked up (T.
evidence

that he had cut

to break a window to get

lnl).

At

trial,

appellant presented

his hands a week earlier when he had
into his own home (T.

state presented evidence that appellant

173).

The

harl given a different

explanation to the two officers who first

detained him (T.

192, 193), and yet another explanation to Officer Maack
121) •

(T.

Even though these explanations were given to the

officers prior to the time appellant

received

the Miranda

rights, counsel for the appellant did not object at the time
such testimony was given at trial

(T.

101, ln2,

explanations were received as evidence.
for mistrial on the matter was denied

(T.

192, 193);

the

A subsequent motion
244,

245).

Also during the trial proceedings counsel for the
appellant objected to the prosecutor's questions directed to
Officer Maack about the events at the time of identification
and the reading of the Miranda rights (T. 'l9).

Counsel then moved for a mistrial on

was overruled (T. 99).

the grounds that the questioning was
post arrest sentence (T. 1.03).
was denied

(T.

159).

The objection

a comment on appellant's

That motion for a mistrial

Months later, on an appeal to the same

court, counsel for the appellant made a motion for a
for the same reasons and

that mot ion was denied

-4-

( P.

new trial
4 28).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THF PROSECUTOR'S SOLICITATION OF TESTIMONY
FROM A POLICE OFFICER AS TO THE EVENTS AT
THE TIME THE APPELLANT RECEIVED THE
MIRANDA RIGHTS WAS PROPER AS IT
ESTABLISHED THE FOUNDATION FOR A LATER
STATEMENT MADE BY APPELLANT.
Appellant contends that the prosecutor's
solicitation of testimony from Officer Maack as to the
rirrLJmstanrPs at the time of his identification and subsequent
receipt of the Miranda rights violated his Fifth Amendment
privilege and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights as an
improper comment on his post-arrest silence.
The testimony solicited by the prosecutor now in
question,

is as follows:

o.

( T.

9 7- 1 0 0) •

After she made her identification of the

individual, what did you do?
A.

I placed the individual back in my car and read

him his rights.

o.

What rights did you read?

A.

Miranda.

o.

Did you read that from a card, or personally, or

A.

From a card.

o.

Did he indicate that he understood his rights?

l\.

Yes, sir, he did.

o.

For the record, do you have the card with you?

what?

-s-

A.

No, sir, I don't.

o.

Can you remember what the card said, what the

rights are that you gave?
A.

always read it directly from a card.

o.

Is that a standard practice procedure card?

A.

Yes,

O.

After reading that, did you ask him if

it is.
he

understood his rights?
A.

Yes, sir, I did.

o.

Did he respond?

A.

Yes, sir.

o.

What did he say?

A.

I can describe the car a little bit.

Miranda

is

on the one side and you turn it over and on the other side it
asks i f those are -- if they completely understand the Miranda
that they have been given and if they wish to make a statement
or talk to an attorney.

o.

Did he respond to that question?

A.

He responded to both.

o.

What did he say?

A.

He said he understood his rights and he really

didn't have anything to say.
MR.

EBERT:

Your Honor,

I object and

I reserve a

mot ion.
THE COURT:

The objection is overruled.

MR.

your Honor,

EBERT:

-f,-

I would ask to argue this

right now.
THE COURT:

You may proceed.

MR. EBERT:

Your Honor, I would like to argue it

the presence of the jury.
THE COURT:

You will have an opportunity to do that.

You may proceed with your questioning.
MR. GUNNARSON:
o.

Thank you.

(By Mr. Gunnarson) Did he indicate he didn't

want to talk to you?
A.

At that time he did, yes.

o.

What exactly did he say?

A.

Something to the effect that he didn't have

anything to say.
o.

Did he say he had nothing to say or that he

didn't want to talk to you?

to the

A.

Just that he didn't have anything to say.

o.

What happened next?

A.

I left the scene and was transporting him down

jail,
o.

okay.

was there any conversation at that time?

A.

yes, sir.

o.

Who intiated the conversation?

A.

He did.

Who started it?

He made a statement to me when I first
was taking him back to the

got back into the vehicle when
j a i 1•

o.

was this in response to a question you asked

him?
-7-

equipment,

A,

No.

o.

What did he say?

A.

He sa irl,

"I guess she saw me with the steren

too?"
The above dialCXJue is the only reference

in the

record that could even be construed as an improper comment by
the prosecutor.

There is no indication that the prosecutor in

this situation purposefully placed the appellant's silence
before the jury in an attempt to discredit the appellant.

The

prosecutor did not cross examine the appellant as to his
reaction at the time he received the Miranda, nor did the
prosecutor comment on appellant's silence in his closing
argument.

The testimony was soliciterl for the appropriate

purpose of establishing a foundation for appellant's voluntary
statement, "I guess she saw me with the stereo equipment too."
Moreover, it was appellant's counsel who made repeated
reference to appellant's silence at the time he received the
Miranda rights (T. 116, 17R).
While appellant claims that the testirrony had no
relevance or probative value to the state's case, the
prosecutor explained that the state need to properly lay a
foundation for appellant's voluntary statement concerning his
knowledge of the stereo equipment.

When this

was brought before the lower court,

in presentation of

arguments to the trial

identical

issue

judge the prosecutor clearly outlined

his motives for soliciting testimony from Officer Maack

-8-

concerning the events at the time the Miranda rights were
given to the appellant:
concerning the stereo]
he a foundation

"Now, anticipating that

[the statment

was going to come out and there had to

laid for it,

came in under

then the question of two parts

custody first, and foundation in court

that the Miranda warnings had been given."

(R. 428, 42'l).

It needed to be established that the appellant had
received and understood the Miranda rights and had not been
coerced by law enforcement personnel to give a confession
about his knowledge of the stereo equipment.

There was no

error in soliciting testimony concerning the events at the
time of appellant's arrest when the purpose was to lay a
foundation for later testi!T'Ony.
Furthermore case law totally supports the use of
The situation in this

such testimony for legitimate purposes.

case is virtually identical to that in State v. Urias, Utah,
609 P.2d 1326

(l'lRO), where the Prosecutor questioned a police

officer as follows:

o.

And as I

recall, you testified concerning this

statement as to the defendant's rights?
A.

*

o.
did you ask

Yes, Sir.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

After you read him the statement of his rights,
if he understood them?

A.

Yes, Sir.

o.

And what was his answer?

-9-

A.

attorney

He

exerciserl

his

rl(Jhts

rind

t<'

cnntact

dn

before he made any statement.

o.

nid he

thereafter discuss this matter with ynu

at that time?
A.

No,

Sir.

o.

Alright-

THF CO!JRT:
stricken.

It

is a

asked him if he
no.

T ca l 1e ci h is

The last pa rt

is

it with him and

to be disregarded.

There the defendant
silent had

of the answer wil 1 he

volunteer statement by the witness.

then discussed

Anything else

at t n r n •' y.

been violated by the testimony.

the answer is,

Urias,

claimed that his

at 1328.

right to remain

This Court replied

as follows:
we agree with the proposition that when a

person invokes his constitutional rights,

the prosecution should not comment
thereon, nor so use it in any way that
will tend to impair or destroy that
privilege.
But we do not perceive that
this was done in this case.
Except for
what was said above, there was no further
reference to the matter, either in
testimony or in argument to the jury.
It
is apparent that the prosecutor was having
the officer testify to the circumstances
of the arrest and that the information
elicited was but a part of the natural
sequence of events.
It is difficult to
see how that could have been done, or how
the case could have been presented without
the jury becoming aware in some manner
that the defendant had, in fact, exercised
his right to remain silent.
I t is
significant that there is no indication
that the prosecutor made any attempt to
use that fact to cast any inference of
guilt of the defenrlant, nor to persuade
the jury to do so.
urias, at 1328.
-10-

YOU

The prosecutor in this case, as

in !Irias, did not

impair or destroy the appellant's constitutional right.
merely el ici terl

He

information that was a part of the natural

se0uence of events at the time of arrest.

The prosecutor when

cross-examining the appellant rlirl not refer to his silence at
the time of arrest,

nor did the prosecutor comment on

appellant's silence in his closing argument.

The prosecutor

rlid not attempt to cast any inference of guilt upon the
appellant, nor did he attempt to hias
Urias,

the

jury.

Based on

there was no prejudicial error committed that requires

a new trial .

Likewise, when other jurisidictions have heen

presented with this issue they have found no error.
Arizona is one of a number of jurisdicitions which
have considered the issue raised here,

i.e., whether or not it

is reversible error per se to make any reference to a
defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent before the
jury.

In State v. Bowie, 119 Ariz.

336, 580 P.2d ll'lO (1'!78),

a prosecutor had asked a police officer,

"After you read Mr.

Rowie his rights did Mr. Bowie make any statement to you?"
The officer answered,

"No"

The Arizona Supreme Court stated:

Generally, it is error for the prosecutor
to draw a derogatory inference from the
fact that the accused declined to speak to
police upon his arrest.
(Cites to Doyle
v. Ohio 426 U.S. 610 (1'!76))
However, in
the present case, the prosecutor never
commented upon the accused's silence
during custodial interrogation; the
prosecutor merely questioned the officer
about the events of the arrest and
inquired whether the defendant said
anything.
-11-

The rationale of Doyle, supra, suggests
that the state should not make any
reference to the fact that the rlefenrlant
exercised his right to remain silent after
arrest.
Consequently, it was improiwr for
the prosecutor to ask the otficer if
appellant made any
hut we rlo
not find the quest ion to he reversihle
error for the following reasons:
This one
exchange between the prosecutor and
officer was the only time appellant's
post-arrest silence was mentioned; when
appellant took the stand he was not
cross-examined ahout his failure to give a
statement to the police; the prosecutor
said nothing about appellant's silent in
his jury arguments.
Under these
circumstances, we find that the
prosecutor's improper question dirl not
prejudice appellant, and there was no
reversible error.
at 1195.
In State v. Satterfield, 3 Kan. App.

2d 212,

592

P. 2d 135 ( 1979), the Court noted:
(T)he trial court erred when it
allowed evidence to he introduced that
dealt with defendant's election to remain
silent in the absence of his attorney
Nevertheless, a new trial is not
required if the court finds from the
totality of
circumstances that such
conduct constituted harmless error beyond
a reasonable douht.
592 P.2d at 142.
The Court in State v.

LeBrun,

37 Or.App. 411,

P. 2d 1044 ( 19713), also stated:
Assuming arguendo that the officer
should not have been permitted to testify
as to defendant's unwillingness to discuss
the matter further, the important inquiry,
of course, is the prejudice likely to flow
from the officer's testimony.
Given the
-12-

587

overwhelming evidence of guilt, we are
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
the result of the trial would not have
been different wihout the challenged
answer.
587 P.2d at 1046.

See also People v. Rooney,

16 Ill.App.3d

9nl, 307 N.E.2d 216 at 219 (1974); United States v. Dixon, 593
F.2d 62fi at 628-629 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Sklaroff, 552 F.2d 1156 at 1161-1162 (5th Cir. 1977); Moore v.
Cowan, 560 F.2d 1298 at 1302 (6th Cir. 1977); and Taylor v.
Dalsheim, 459 F.supp.

2fi0 at 263-264 (S.O.N.Y 1978).

All of these cases bear remarkable similarity to the
matter at hand,

In each case the fact of the defendant's

post-Miranda warning silence was

introduced into testimony.

In each case that fact was not used to cross-examine the
defendant nor used during the prosecutor's closing arguments.
Appellant cites a few cases that hold that reference
to post-arrest silence warrants reversal, but these cases,
Doyle v. Ohio, 4 26 u .s. 610 ( 1976 I, and State v. Wiswell,
Utah, fi39 P.2d 146

( 1981 I are readily distinguishable.

In

both cases, the prosecutor, during cross-examination,
repeatedly referred to the defandants'

post-arrest silence.

In addition the prosecutors argued the defendants' post-arrest
silence to the juries in their closing arguments.

Since Doyle

and Wiswell govern in instances where the prosecutor makes
continued attempts to put
Jury,

the defendant's silence before the

they do not apply to this situation where the prosecutor

did not make any attempt to place the appellant's silence
hefore the Jury.
-13-

Furthermore, the fact

that appellant chnse tn give

his voluntary statement in the police car, mintues after
receiving the Miranda rights infers that he never chose to
remain silent.

His first statement that hP did not have

anything to say at that time could he

interpretted to mean, "I

don't have anything to say right now but I will tell you
something in a few mintues,"

If such was the case the

appellant's right to remain silent was never invoked.
Despite appellant's claim, there was no intent on
the part of the prosecutor to interpret appellant's silence as
an inference of guilt.

Had the prosecutor intended to do so

he would likely have used the silence while cross-examining
appellant or certainly during his closing remarks,
Nevertheless, during both of these crucial periods the state
made no mention whatsoever of appellant's exercise of his
Fifth Amendment freedoms.
in context,

As the offending remarks are read

it is clear that the prosecutor was merely

inquiring into the circumstances of the arrest and attempting
to make the officer's testimony clear and coherent.

The

prosecutor was laying an appropriate foundation for
appellant's statement concerning the stereo equipment.
However, should this Court find that the manner of
questioning did improperly comment on Appellant's post arrest
silence, the error was harmless in the context of this record
and

is not sufficient to merit a reversal.

-14-

The evidence of appellant's guilt apart from any
inferences created by the fact of appellant's silence after
receipt of the Miranda rights was overwhelming.

Ms. Bailey

identified the appellant as the man she had watched walk from
heh ind the bush, right in front of her car and the down the
street (T. 44).

A stereo, missing from the home next door to

Mr, Bailey's was discovered in the bush where the appellant
was first seen (T. 90).

Entry had been made into Mr.

Goldstein's home hy breaking the glass on the front door, and
the Appellant had fresh cuts on his hands with three different
explanations as to how he got the cuts (T, 90, 120, 173, 193).
Then after receiving the Miranda rights, the appellant asked
Officer Maack if Ms. Bailey had seen him with the stereo (T.
100).
What this Court said in State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d
1338 (Utah 1977), most certainly has application in this case:
This court does not interfere with a
jury verdict because of error of
irregularity unless upon review of the
entire record it is determined that
prejudice has occurred in a substantial
manner, i.e. the error must be such that
there exists a reasonable probability or
likelihood that there would have been a
result more favorable to the defendant in
absence of the error.
572 P.2d at 1352.
rn conclusion, while it is well established that
although admission of the fact of a criminal defendant's
post-arrest silence is error, such error does not require

-15-

reversal

in every case.

The harmless err,,r rule> shr>u J ,1 t>e

applied and reversal

is only mandated when there is a

possibility that the

jury verrl ict would hcive t>een different

without the offending testimony.

In this matter there was

overwhelming evidence of arpellant 's c1u1 Jt.

Any possible

inference created by the mention of appellant's silence could
not reasonably have made a difference

in the

finding of guilt.

Consequently, the verdict and sentence of the lower court must
be affirmed.

POINT II
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION.
Appellant contends that the evidence presented by
the state was insufficient to support a guilty verdict of
theft heyonc1 a reasonable doubt.
Appellant was charged with Theft a Third Degree
Felony,

under Utah Code

7fi-fi-404,

412 (Supp.

l'l7R).

was established during the trial that a theft occured when
someone obtained unauthorized control over Mr. Goldstein's
stereo by breaking

into his home and removing the stereo

without his permission, and that the person intended to
deprive Mr. Goldstein of the stereo's use when he hid the
stereo in the bush.

The issue at trial was deciding whether

the appellant was the person who had committed the act of
theft.

It

The state presented sufficient evidence linking the
appellant with the crime.

First, the state presented a

witness who acutally saw the appellant come from the location
where the stereo was found.

Second, the state showed that

entry had bPen made into Mr. Goldstein's home by breaking the
door glass and that at the time the appellant was picked up he
had fresh cuts on his hands,

Finally, the appellant's own

statement, "I suppose she saw me with the stereo equipment,
too" further incriminated him.
Ms.

Bailey, the eye witness, a young woman, age 26

testified that she saw the appellant step from around a bush
and walk

in front of her car, forcing her to stop (T. 37, 73)

At that close range, with the car headlights shining on
appellant, she was able to watch him for fifteen to twenty
seconds (T. 3R).

After finding a stereo in the bush where Ms.

Bailey first noticed the appellant, she called the police (T.
police officers found the appellant

41).

just blocks away

from Ms. Bailey's home and took him to her home for a show-up
( T.

q3).

Ms. Railey identified appellant as the man she had

seen a few hours earlier (T. 44).

The short time period

between Ms. Bailey's initial sighting of appellant when he
walked

in front of her car and the subsequent identification

at the show up greatly enhanced the likelihood of a correct
identification.

Moreover, Ms. Bailey was consistent in her

identification of appellant at the show up, preliminary
hearing and the trial

(T. 44, 69, 51).
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Ms. Bailey's

eyewitness account

suhstant li'll

appellant was the perpetrator of
inferred that when Ms.

P\'Jdence that

the theft.

Railey first

Jt

can he

saw thP appPllant

hiding the stereo in the hush after carryinij

he was

it away from Mr.

Goldstein's home.
Next,

it was estahlished that entry had been made

into Mr. Goldstein's home by breaking the
that

door glass and

appellant had fresh cuts on his hands at the time he was

picked up (T. 'lO,
by the
1 20 '

front

lr11).

Then contradictory stories were given

appellant explaining the fresh cuts on his hands (T.

17 3 , 1 9 2 ) •

This evidence estahlished appellant's guilt

by showing that the appellant did not have the authority to
enter Mr. Goldstein's home and
to break

remove his stereo since he had

in to the home.
Finally,

appellant's voluntary admission of

knowledge concerning the stereo equipment further established
appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant next argues that the state did not present
evidence that appellant was
the property.

However,

the

individual who actually stole

the circumstantial evidence as

presented by the state was certainly sufficient
conviction,

"In Utah,

to establish a

as elsewhere, circumstanial evidence

alone may be competent to establish the guilt of the accused."
State v. Clayton, Utah,

fi4fi

P.2d 723, 725 (l'lR2l.

Moreover

the state is aided by the statutory J:'resumtion, lltah Code Ann.
<;;

76-6-402(1)

(1978)

that:

"Possession of property recently
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stolen, when no satisfactory explanation of such possession is
made, shall

be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in

possession stole the property."
Finally,

appellant argues that the jury's acquittal

of appellant on the burglary charge indicated that the jury
was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of appellant's
guilt.

such a contention is sheer speculation by appellant.

The jury did find appellant guilty of theft.

What the jury

chose to do with the burglary charge is of no consequence to
this appeal that deals with the theft conviction.
When reviewing insufficiency of the evidence charges
this Court follows the standard set out in State v. Mccardell,
Utah, f)52

P.2d 942 (l'l82).
This Court will not lightly overturn the
findings of a jury.
We must view the
evidence properly presented at trial in
the light most favorable to the jury's
verdict, and will only interfere when the
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial
that a reasonable man could not possibly
have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable
doubt.

Mccardell, at 945,
443,

see also State v. Petree, Utah, fi59 P.2d

444 ( 1983).

In summary, the evidence presented at trial was
sufficient to sustain the verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, and when viewed in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict, appellant's conviction should be affirmed.
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CONCL!IS ]n"J
The State was merely laying a foundation for
appellant's statement concerning thP steorP<' eq11i 1Hnent
solicited testimony concerning the circumstances at
of arrest.

The error,

if

any,

was harmless.

when

it

the time

Further,

the

evidence presented by the State was sufficient to support
appellant's guilt of Theft beyond a reasonahle douht.
For these reasons,

the State respectfully submits

that appellant's convict ion be affirmed.
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